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 Cognitive Closure and Risk Sensitivity in the Fear of Crime 
 
Jonathan Jackson, Department of Methodology and Mannheim Centre for Criminology, LSE 
 
 
 
  
Abstract  
 
Purpose. This study was designed to answer two questions. First, does the risk sensitivity 
model of worry about crime replicate in three European countries? Second, can the model be 
extended to include need for cognitive closure? 
 
Method. A national probability survey in Italy, Bulgaria and Lithuania measured worry about 
criminal victimisation, risk perception, and need for cognitive closure. Additive and 
interactive relationships between latent constructs were tested using latent moderated 
structural equation modelling.  
 
Results. First, perceived likelihood, control and consequence were statistically significant 
additive predictors of worry about crime. Second, the association between subjective 
probability judgments and worry about crime was stronger among people who associated the 
uncertain event with serious personal consequences and among people who had a high need 
for cognitive closure. Third, need for cognitive closure was associated with greater perceived 
consequences of victimisation, but not with different perceptions of the likelihood and 
controllability of personal victimisation. 
 
Conclusions. This study provides empirical support for an extended risk sensitivity model in 
three European countries. Findings suggest that risk perception involves multiple – and 
interacting – dimensions that constitute sensitivity to risk, as well as individual differences in 
knowledge construction, information judgement and processing. Future work should address 
(a) whether probability judgements shift psychological distance to uncertain future outcomes, 
and (b) whether the effect of psychological distance on worry about crime is greater among 
people who construe the outcome to be severe in consequence and who desire definite 
knowledge and dislike uncertainty in their lives. 
 
Key words: fear of crime; risk perception; need for cognitive closure; psychological proximity; 
sensitivity to risk; affect; worry. 
 
 
 
Why do people worry about becoming a victim of crime? A good deal of research has 
explored people’s anxieties, worries and fears about criminal victimisation. Generating a rich 
and interdisciplinary literature (for reviews see Hale, 1996, Farrall et al., 2009, and Lorenc et 
al., 2013), this work has addressed inter alia personal experience of criminal victimisation 
(e.g. Winkel, 1998), neighbourhood context and geography (e.g. Brunton-Smith & Sturgis, 
2011), individual assessments of neighbourhood disorder and control (e.g. Perkins & 
Taylor,1996), issues of gender and age (Bromley & Stacey, 2012; Kappes et al., 2013; Lane 
& Fox, 2013), underlying social attitudes and anxieties (e.g. Girling et al., 2000; Wickes et 
al., 2013), the role of the mass media (e.g. Nellis & Savage, 2012), and the nature and impact 
of perceived risk (e.g. Ferraro, 1995). 
All these factors seem to be important in ‘fear of crime,’ but risk perception seems to 
be the most proximate to emotional response (Warr & Stafford, 1983; Killias, 1990; Killias & 
Clerici, 2000). Constituting not only subjective probability judgements (‘what is the chance 
that I will fall victim over the next year?’) but also one’s sense of the consequences of crime 
(‘what impact would falling victim have on my life?’) and one’s felt ability to control whether 
or not they become a victim (‘can I control whether or not I become a victim?’), risk 
perception has explained a good deal of variance in emotional response to risk in a number of 
studies (e.g. Jackson, 2009, 2011; Ireland, 2011). For instance, Custers & Van den Bulck 
(2012) found that women who experienced high levels of fear of sexual violence also tended 
to feel unable to defend themselves from sexual violence, tended to believe that the 
consequences of sexual violence are severe, and tended to believe that it is likely that they 
will personally become a victim of sexual violence.  
The objective of this paper is to contribute to a growing literature on risk perception 
and risk sensitivity in the fear of crime. Risk sensitivity is the idea that people’s emotional 
response to a sense of proximate (e.g. seemingly probable) threat is heightened under certain 
conditions – specifically when the perceived cost of the outcome is high (Warr, 1987) and 
when one’s personal sense of control is low (Jackson, 2011). Prior survey research, which has 
been conducted using city or neighbourhood level surveys (Warr, 1987; Jackson, 2011; 
although see Custers & Van den Bulck, 2012), has found that the observed association 
between subjective probability judgments and worry about victimization is stronger when 
people believe that a given crime is difficult to control and would have severe personal 
consequences . Subjective probabilities seem to combine with the construal of the outcome 
(consequence and controllability) to generate affective response. 
This study has two objectives. The first is to assess whether the risk sensitivity model 
replicates in three European countries (Italy, Bulgaria and Lithuania) using much larger 
survey samples than have been employed hitherto. The second is to explore whether need for 
cognitive closure can extend the framework in a theoretically novel way. Need for cognitive 
closure is a cognitive style – a way of processing the world. People with a high need for 
cognitive closure have a preference for predictability, an aversion to uncertainty, and an 
inclination for order and structure in an uncertain world (Kruglanksi & Webster, 1996). But 
need for cognitive closure is also situationally determined – it becomes activated when one’s 
immediate environment is ambiguous and unpredictable. In such situations, people with a 
high need for cognitive closure rush to answers and definition, form judgments quickly and 
strongly, and prefer not to alter their swiftly formed beliefs in the wake of alternative or 
supplement evidence. 
The present study examines whether people with a high need for cognitive closure 
experience a significant sense of risk as more emotionally unsettling, thereby strengthening 
the observed correlation between perceived likelihood and experienced worry. According to 
Kruglanski & Webster (1996: 264), need for cognitive closure may ‘induce negative affect 
when closure is threatened or undermined and positive affect when it is facilitated or 
attained.’ The current study thus assesses whether need for cognitive closure interacts with 
subjective probability judgements to predict levels of worry about crime. The study also 
explores whether people with a high need for cognitive closure perceive different levels of 
criminal threat around them. On the one hand they may be motivated not to see uncertain 
threat around them because this brings uncertainty and ambiguity into their lives. On the other 
hand they may tend to ‘seize’ and ‘freeze’ on circulating representations of crime that are 
biased towards the dramatic and sensational. In this regard the current study is exploratory, in 
that it provides the first correlational assessment of the links between need for cognitive 
closure, risk perception and fear of crime. 
The next section reviews the risk sensitivity model. The theoretical framework is then 
extended to include need for cognitive closure. After documenting the method and results, the 
paper closes with the strengths, limitations and implications of the study.  
 
REPLICATING THE RISK SENSITIVITY MODEL  
The risk sensitivity model was first developed by Mark Warr (1987). Conducting a city-wide 
survey of residents of Seattle, Warr found that when people judged crime to be especially 
serious in its effect, a lower level of perceived likelihood was needed to stimulate some level 
of personal fear. Individuals were thus more ‘sensitive’ to a given level of perceived risk 
when they viewed the consequences of victimization to be especially serious. The model was 
then developed in a London-based study. Jackson (2011) found that a sense of personal 
consequence and a sense of control moderated the observed statistical effect of perceived 
likelihood on emotional response. When people associated criminal victimisation with strong 
personal consequences and believed these events were difficult to control, then fitted levels of 
worry were relatively high even the perceived likelihood of victimisation was low. 
 Why might perceived likelihood interact with perceived consequence and perceived 
control to predict worry? One possibility centres around the link between perceived likelihood 
and psychological distance. In the words of Trope and Liberman (2010: 442): ‘Psychological 
distance refers to the perception of when an event occurs, where it occurs, to whom it occurs, 
and whether it occurs.’ Something is close (i.e. psychologically proximate) or far (i.e. 
psychologically distant) according to distance dimensions of time (when), space (where), 
social distance (to whom) and hypothetical (whether). If probability judgements reflect the 
psychological proximity or distance of victimisation threat (cf. Bar-Anan, Liberman, and 
Trope, 2006; Wakslak and Trope, 2009), then believing that one is likely to fall victim of 
crime (over the following twelve months, say) is to represent that event as psychologically 
proximate on a number of different distance dimensions. To believe that there is a high 
probability of falling victim of crime is to perceive the future uncertain event as 
psychologically proximate: it seems real (so not hypothetical), closer in space (so likely to 
happen in the areas one frequents), closer in time (saying something is likely to happen over 
the next twelve months brings it closer in time), and relevant to oneself (it is likely to happen 
to oneself, not just to other people).  
Viewed through the lens of psychological distance, judgements about the probability 
of victimisation move the hypothetical event to be more or less psychologically proximate. 
According to Todorov et al. (2007) subjective probabilities reflect psychological distance 
with respect to distance to the outcome. Studies of risk sensitivity suggest that perceptions of 
the consequence of the outcome (Warr, 1987) and controllability of the event (Jackson, 2011) 
alter the strength of association between psychological proximity (represented by probability 
judgements) and emotion. Psychological distance thus seems to interact with a sense of the 
seriousness of the outcome (as well as feelings of control over the event itself) to stimulate 
affective response.
1
  
                                                 
1
 Imagine a dial that determines the level of everyone’s sense of likelihood. When turned up or down, 
everyone’s perceived likelihood moves up or down together, shifting the psychological distance closer 
This study first assesses whether the risk sensitivity model replicates beyond Seattle 
and London. Figure 1 summarises the model and its constituent hypotheses (focus on the non-
dashed lines that correspond to hypotheses 1 to 7 – the dashed lines corresponding to 
hypotheses 8 to 12 represent the extension of the model that is discussed below. Also note 
that all the constructs refer to the risk of criminal victimisation, in this case being burgled and 
being physically attacked in the street by a stranger). To worry about becoming a victim of 
crime one needs to judge some sort of personal threat (cf. Berenbaum, 2010). In the current 
framework, people’s perceptions of threat are constituted by their sense of likelihood, 
consequence and control. 
 
H1, H2 and H3: perceived likelihood (H1), perceived control (H2) and perceived 
consequence (H3) each predict worry about crime, with likelihood and consequence 
to be positively associated with worry, and control to be negatively associated with 
worry. 
 
These hypotheses refer to additive statistical effects; if all three hypotheses are confirmed, 
then perceived likelihood, perceived control and perceived consequence have combined 
statistical effects on worry about crime (in the sense that they are additive predictors of 
expressed worry about crime).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As noted above, the risk sensitivity model also posits two moderating relationships 
between (a) likelihood and consequence and (b) likelihood and control.  
 
H4: the higher the perceived consequence the stronger the association between 
perceived likelihood and worry about crime (and vice versa: the higher the perceived 
likelihood the stronger the association between perceived consequence and worry). 
 
H5: the lower the perceived control the stronger the association between perceived 
likelihood and worry about crime (and vice versa: the higher the perceived likelihood 
the stronger the association between perceived control and worry).  
 
Finally, judgements about the probability of victimisation are expected to covary with 
judgements about personal consequence and perceived controllability (replicating Jackson, 
2011). People who construe a given crime as serious in its personal consequences and 
personally uncontrollable are expected to perceive the likelihood of it happening to be 
relatively high, because it is easier to imagine being victimised when one represents the 
criminal event in vivid and emotionally interesting ways. Vivid events are more often seen as 
high probability compared to pallid events – a finding often attributed to the availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). But, according to Wakslak & Trope (2009), this 
could be to do with psychologically proximate events being typically construed using less 
abstract and more concrete attributes. Representing crime as serious in its outcome and 
difficult to control may mean that the event is construed as dramatic and is easy to imagine 
(because of mass media bias towards sensational crimes). More concrete processing is also 
associated with more psychological proximate construal (Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
to or further away from the uncertain future outcome. According to the risk sensitivity model, turning 
the dial up would result in higher expected levels of worry or fear among people who represent the 
crime as serious in its personal consequence and as difficult to control. 
H6 and H7: perceived consequence (H6) and perceived control (H7) each predict 
perceived likelihood (consequence is expected to be positively associated with 
likelihood, while control is expected to be negatively associated with likelihood).  
 
EXTENDING THE RISK SENSITIVITY MODEL TO INCLUDE NEED FOR COGNITIVE 
CLOSURE 
Need for cognitive closure is defined by Kruglanski and Webster (1996: 278) as: 
 
‘…a desire for definite knowledge on some issue and the eschewal of confusion 
and ambiguity … need for closure is presumed to exert its effects via two 
general tendencies: the urgency tendency, reflecting the inclination to attain 
closure as quickly as possible, and the permanence tendency, reflecting the 
tendency to maintain it for as long as possible.’  
 
First, people with high need for cognitive closure are expected to respond in stronger ways to 
the perceived likelihood of criminal victimisation (see the dashed lines in Figure 1). Need for 
cognitive closure involves a preference for predictability and decisiveness, a discomfort with 
ambiguity, a closed mindedness, and an inclination for order and structure. Applied to the risk 
sensitivity model, need for cognitive closure may mean that people with a high need for 
cognitive closure experience a high probability (i.e. psychologically proximate) uncertain 
event as more unsettling and more difficult to resolve. Conversely, people with a high need 
for cognitive closure may experience a low probability (psychologically distant) uncertain 
event as less troubling and less worrying.  
In keeping with the risk sensitivity model, this may involve not only an additive 
statistical effect of need for cognitive closure (on top of the effects of perceived likelihood, 
control and consequence), but also a multiplicative statistical effect of cognitive closure and 
perceived likelihood on worry. People may worry more frequently about a psychologically 
proximate event occurring when they have an aversion to uncertainty and a need for certain 
knowledge. Low psychological distance to the outcome (i.e. crime) brings uncertainty into 
one’s life, and people with a high need for cognitive closure may find this especially 
troubling. Conversely, people with a high need for cognitive closure may worry less 
frequently about a psychologically distant event – psychological distance plausibly creates a 
sense of predictability and a lack of ambiguity that induces positive affect. 
 
H8 and H9: need for cognitive closure predicts worry (H8) and moderates (H9) the 
effect of perceived likelihood on worry about crime (and vice versa: perceived 
likelihood moderates the effect of need for cognitive closure on worry about crime).  
 
 Second, cognitive closure is expected to be associated with perceived likelihood, 
control and consequence. While there is no prior evidence on the links between cognitive 
closure and risk perception, there are reasons to expect an association. On the one hand 
Kruglanski & Webster’s (1996) theory predicts that people with a high need for cognitive will 
be motivated not to see uncertain threat around them. To see uncertain but psychologically 
proximate threat is to bring ambiguity and uncertainty into their lives. As Berenbaum (2010: 
968) speculates: ‘Individuals with strong desires for certainty are likely to have difficulty 
accepting the prospect of threatening outcomes not only because they fear the outcomes but 
also because of their disinclination to accept any form of uncertainty (which is inherent in any 
uncertain future threat).’ Thus, people with a high need for cognitive closure may be 
motivated to see crime as a low-probability event that is easy to control and does not have 
strong personal consequences. 
On the other hand, people with a high need for cognitive closure may also tend to see 
crime as high probability, as difficult to control, and as serious in its personal consequences. 
Mass media tend to report not the common (relatively high probability) crimes that typically 
have less  personal consequences for the victim, but the rare crimes that have severe personal 
consequences. When seeking out and/or processing information about crime – whether from 
the mass media or from interpersonal communication – people with a high need for cognitive 
closure may use less complex information-seeking strategies, employ more basic heuristics, 
and more readily ‘seize’ on media representations of crime and ‘freeze’ on the sense of risk 
and harm (cf. Kruglanksi and Webster, 1996). They are expected to process less information 
before committing to a judgment; to base judgments on early cues; to rely on stereotypes 
rather than de-individuating information; and to be motivated to keep close to initial 
impressions rather than correct them in light of subsequent evidence.  
It is not that people with a high need for cognitive closure are expected to more 
actively seek out information about crime and risk (in fact they may be motivated not to seek 
out such information). But when individuals do come across crime reports (or information 
about crime more generally), those with a high need for cognitive closure may be more likely 
to rely upon these instances of crime when forming their personal sense of risk and 
possibility. Given that the most eye-catching and available images of crime are the most vivid 
events (those that the mass media tend to focus upon, e.g. Gekoksi et al., 2012), people with 
high need for cognitive closure may construct their personal risk of crime as more 
consequential, less controllable and more likely.  
In keeping with these expectations, which go both ways, the final set of hypotheses 
state only expected associations not expected direction of associations. 
 
H10, H11 and H12: need for cognitive closure predicts perceived likelihood (H10), 
perceived consequence (H11) and perceived control (H12).  
 
METHOD 
Sample  
A nationally representative survey of adults in Italy, Bulgaria and Lithuania was fielded in 
2009, with data collected via computer-assisted personal interviewing. The surveys were 
conducted by different organisations in different countries (although they were centrally co-
ordinated by the EuroJustis team, see Hough & Sato, 2011). The survey in Italy was done by 
GfK Austria, with individuals aged 16 years old and over selected using stratified random 
sampling for the following quotas: regions and city sizes (interlocked), gender and age 
(interlocked), level of education and occupation. In each quota, the sampling points were 
selected randomly. The achieved sample in Italy was 522, with a response rate of 28%. The 
survey in Bulgaria was conducted by Vistosha Research. The sampling method was two-stage 
random route cluster sampling, producing a sample representative of the Bulgarian population 
aged 18 and over, designed to reproduce the basic socio-demographic parameters of the 
population aged 18+ as of the data from the last Parliamentary elections (July 2009). The total 
number completed interviews in Bulgaria was 1,008, with a response rate of 63%. The survey 
in Lithuania was conducted by Vilmorus. Multi-stage random sampling was used to produce a 
probability sample, covering 18 towns and 54 villages. The sample consisted of 1,021 
respondents, comprised of Lithuanian inhabitants aged 16 and over, with a response rate of 
37%.  
Table 1 shows the demographic composition of the three samples. Just over half of 
the individuals in each sample were female. The mean age was around 50 years old in all 
three countries. Most people lived in a big city, a town or small city, or in a country village. 
 
INSERT TABLE ONE 
 Measures 
European Social Survey measures of worry about crime were used (see: Jackson & Kuha, 
2013). Respondents were asked: ‘During the last 12 months have you ever felt worried about 
being physically attacked in the street by a stranger?’. If they said yes they were then asked 
‘How many times have you felt like this in the past 12 months?’. Options were: ‘all or most of 
the time’, ‘some of the time’, ‘just occasionally’ and ‘never’. The same two questions were 
also asked about ‘having your home broken into and something stolen.’ Respondents were 
also asked: ‘Does this worry about being physically attacked in the street have a …’ with the 
options being ‘…serious effect on the quality of your life’, ‘…some effect’ and ‘…no real 
effect on the quality of your life?’. A comparable set of questions were also asked about 
‘having your home broken into and something stolen.’2 
Risk perception was measured using three sets of questions. The first set focused on 
the perception of the likelihood of being criminally victimized, with respondents asked: ‘How 
likely do you think it is that you will fall victim of each of the following crimes during the 
next twelve months?’ (as for the measures of worry, the crimes specified were physical attack 
in the street by a stranger and having one’s home broken into and something stolen). The 
scale ranged from 1 ‘definitely not going to happen’ to 5 ‘certain to happen.’ The second set 
was perceived control, with respondents asked: ‘To what extent do you feel personally able to 
control whether or you will fall victim of each of the following crimes during the next twelve 
months?’ The scale ranged from 1 ‘Not at all able’ to 5 ‘To a very great extent.’ The third set 
was perceived consequence, with respondents asked: ‘To what extent do you think your life 
would be affected if you become a victim of each of the following crimes?’. The scale ranged 
from 1 ‘Not affected much at all’ to 5 ‘Affected to a very great extent.’3  
Need for cognitive closure was measured using five items. Each item was drawn from 
5 sub-facets of a longer scale (Kruglanksi et al., 1993). Respondents were asked to agree to 
disagree with the statements (five point scale from ‘agree strongly’ to ‘disagree strongly’): ‘I 
enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life’ (preference for order and structure); ‘I don't 
like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it’ (‘preference for 
predictability’); ‘I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently’ 
(‘decisiveness’); ‘I don't like situations that are uncertain’ (‘discomfort with ambiguity’); and 
‘I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways’ (‘closed mindedness’). 
Confirmatory factor analysis using pooled data indicated that item 3 (decisiveness) did not 
load well on the latent variable, which is consistent with Mannetti et al.’s (2002) comparison 
of the factor structure of the scale in the US and three European samples (Croatia, Italy and 
Netherlands). Mannetti and colleagues found that the four-facet version of need for cognitive 
                                                 
2
 Confirmatory factor analysis of the four indicators of worry about crime indicated that a one-factor 
solution fitted the data well when applied to the pooled sample, but only when an error covariance was 
allowed between the two violence indicators or the two burglary indicators or both covariances (each 
model produces identical fit statistics: 2 =20, df=1, p=<.01; CFI 0.99; TLI 0.97; RMSEA 0.09, 90%CI 
.06, .12). Because there was no a prior reason to prefer one covariance or the other, subsequent models 
in the study freed up both error covariances. Importantly, sensitivity analyses (available upon request) 
confirmed that removing error covariances did not significantly affect the pattern of results.  
3
 Three measurement models for risk perception were fitted using confirmatory factor analysis (using 
MPlus). The first was a single-factor model. The fit was poor (2 =5,046, df=9, p=<.01; CFI 0.30, TLI -
0.16, RMSEA 0.47, 90%CI 0.46, 0.48). The second model specified one latent variable for perceived 
likelihood and another for perceived control and consequence. Again the fit was unsatisfactory (2 
=3,452, df=8, p<.01; CFI 0.52, TLI 0.11, RMSEA 0.41, 90%CI 0.40, 0.42). The third model specified 
one latent variable for each of perceived likelihood, control and consequence; this time the fit of the 
model was good (2 =45, df=6, p<.01; CFI 0.99, TLI 0.99, RMSEA 0.05, 90%CI 0.04, 0.07).  
closure was a reliable uni-dimensional scale (and that further work needed to be done to 
operationalize ‘the need to decide quickly’). In the current study the third item was dropped.4  
Table 2 shows correlations between latent constructs from a five-factor confirmatory 
factor analysis model where the latent variables were allowed to covary.
5
 Note that the 
strongest associations were between (a) worry and perceived consequence, (b) worry and 
perceived likelihood, and (c) perceived likelihood and perceived consequence. 
 
INSERT TABLE TWO 
 
Control variables in all the proceeding analyses were gender, age and country (two 
dummy variables denoting Italy and Bulgaria, with Lithuania as the reference category). On 
the one hand, gender and age have been shown to be consistent predictors of both risk 
perception (Jackson, 2009) and worry about crime (Brunton-Smith & Sturgis, 2011). On the 
other hand, country of residence has been shown to be a consistent predictor of perceived 
safety of the streets after dark in a number of cross-national studies (Hummelsheim et al., 
2011; Semyonov et al., 2012; Visser et al., 2013) and may also predict perceived risk. It is 
important to adjust for these three factors, because controlling for these covariates reduces the 
possibility that the associations are inflated because they are all influenced by gender, age and 
country of residence.
6
  
 
Analytical strategy 
In order to estimate measurement models and relationships between latent variables, 
structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed on the pooled sample (using MPlus 5.2). 
SEM allows one to model directed paths from one latent variable to another. Latent 
moderated structural equations (Klein and Moosbrugger, 2000) were estimated in order to test 
interaction effects, taking into account the nonnormality caused by the latent nonlinear terms. 
Full information maximum likelihood estimation was also used, meaning that all of each 
respondent’s answers were included in the likelihood function of each fitted model, even 
when these answers did not form a full set of responses. With this approach, maximum 
likelihood estimation of the model produces valid estimates under the assumption that the 
missing data were Missing at Random (MAR, in the sense of Rubin, 1976). The number of 
missing values for the individual indicators ranged from 1 to 125, with no respondent having 
missing values on all manifest variables. 
A further note on the analytical strategy is necessary. Including all three countries in 
the study permits generalisation to the general adult population all three countries (with fixed 
effects included in all analyses to adjust for country membership). The focus of the study is 
                                                 
4
 Fit statistics for a confirmatory factor analysis of the four indicators of need for cognitive closure 
(with an error covariance between the first two indicators) indicate a good fit: 2 =0.5, df=1, p=<.01; 
CFI 1.00; TLI 1.00; RMSEA 0.00, 90%CI .00, .05. 
5
 Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test measurement equivalence for each 
construct separately. The fit of the measurement model that assumed measurement equivalence was 
compared to the fit of a number of measurement models, each of which allowed the error variance, 
intercept and factor loading to differ between countries in all but one of the indicators of each construct 
(separately). Likelihood ratio tests indicated a lack of measurement equivalence, but the factor loadings 
(for example) did not differ very much (details available upon request). Moreover, a recent statistical 
investigation of measurement equivalence in cross-national survey research concluded that ignoring 
nonequivalence can have a big effect on mean comparisons but less of an effect on correlations 
between latent variables (Kuha, 2012). The lack of measurement equivalence was subsequently ignored 
in the main analysis of the current study.  
6
 All models (see Figures 2, 3 and 4) were fitted without these control variables, with little change to 
the estimates (details available on request).  
on the psychological links between need for cognitive closure, risk perception and worry 
about crime, which were assumed to be relatively independent to country setting. While 
country differences in perceived safety of the streets after dark have been shown (e.g. 
Hummelsheim et al., 2011; Semyonov et al., 2012), saying that levels of worry about crime 
vary between countries is not the same thing as saying that the association between perceived 
likelihood and worry about crime (for example) varies between countries. However, 
interactive effects of country on such associations were tested in the present study in order to 
probe the robustness of the findings (for the sake of simplicity, these interaction effects were 
estimated for model 2 and reported below). 
 
RESULTS 
The first stage in the modeling replicated the risk sensitivity model of worry about crime. 
Paths were estimated from perceived control to perceived likelihood and from perceived 
consequence to perceived likelihood. Two latent interaction effects were also estimated. First, 
the relationship between perceived likelihood and worry about crime was estimated to be 
moderated by perceptions of control. Second, the relationship between perceived likelihood 
and worry about crime was estimated to be moderated by perceptions of consequence.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Starting with worry about crime (Figure 2), a significant amount of variation in worry 
was explained by main and interactive effects of the aspects of risk perception (plus gender, 
age and country). Conditioning on gender (b=.12, p=<.01), age (b=.002, p=.04), the Italy 
dummy variable (b=.01, p=.80) and the Bulgaria dummy variable (b=.09, p=.02), there was 
one statistically significant interaction effect (involving perceived likelihood and perceived 
consequence). Here, the fitted slope of perceived likelihood increased as levels of perceived 
consequence increased. Among individuals who saw the personal consequences of 
victimization to be especially high, a lower level of perceived likelihood was needed in order 
to predict relatively frequent worry about crime. The fitted slope of perceived likelihood also 
decreased slightly as levels of perceived control increased, but this was not statistically 
significant. Thus we have evidence supporting hypotheses one, two, three and six. By 
contrast, we have little evidence supporting hypothesis seven.  
Note, in Figure 2, that no fit statistics are given. This is because latent moderated 
structural equation modeling was used, and fit statistics for this complex modeling strategy 
have not yet been developed. However likelihood ratio tests indicated that the interaction 
effect involving likelihood and consequence increased the fit of the model at the 5% 
significance level (the p-level for the interaction effect involving likelihood and control was 
just above 0.05). On advice from an anonymous reviewer, an unconstrained approach to latent 
interactions was used (see Marsh et al., 2004). Suppose the two latent variables in the 
interaction are x1 with indicators z1,...,z3, and x2 with indicators y1,...,y3. A new latent 
variable is estimated, treating the nine products z1*y1, ..., z3*y3 as nine indicators. The fit of 
the model was poor, but the substantive results were similar to the latent moderated structural 
equations approach implemented in MPlus. 
Moving next to risk perception, variation in perceived likelihood was accounted for by 
levels of perceived consequence (b=.20, p<.01) but not by perceived control (b=.03, p=.10), 
conditioning on gender (b=.07, p=.05), age (b=.002, p=.04), Italy dummy variable (b=-.36, 
p<.01) and Bulgaria dummy variable (b=-.17, p<.01). Thus, we have evidence supporting 
hypothesis four but not for hypothesis five. 
The second stage of modelling (Figure 3) added need for cognitive closure to the 
framework (although to simplify the model slightly the two interaction effects outlined above 
were dropped). There was a good fit of the model according to the approximate fit statistics, 
but not according to the exact fit statistics. The only statistically significant association 
between need for cognitive closure and the three different elements of risk perception related 
to perceived consequence: people with high need for cognitive closure tended to believe that 
the consequences of victimization would be higher. This supported hypothesis eleven but not 
hypotheses ten and twelve. Hypothesis eight was not supported; there was no additive effect 
of need for cognitive closure on worry about crime;  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The model presented in Figure 3 was also re-estimated to include interaction effects 
between country and each of the structural paths. While most of the interaction effects were 
not statistically significant, there were three exceptions. First, the estimated effect of cognitive 
closure on consequence was larger in Italy and Bulgaria than it was in Lithuania, although the 
pattern that emerged did not deviate from the general conclusions. Specifically, need for 
cognitive closure was positively associated with perceived consequence of criminal 
victimization – it was just more strongly associated in Italy and Bulgaria. Second, the 
estimated effect of likelihood on worry was larger in Bulgaria than it was in Italy and 
Lithuania, although again the pattern that emerged did not deviate from the general 
conclusions (perceived likelihood was positively associated with worry about crime, it was 
just more strongly associated in Bulgaria). Third, the estimated effect of perceived 
consequence on perceived likelihood was more complex. The effect was positive in Italy, 
there was no effect in Lithuania, and the effect was negative in Bulgaria. But given that 
perceived consequence seems to play a less important part in the current model than 
perceived likelihood, this was not deemed to be particularly troublesome to the present 
investigation – although it is clearly a puzzle (and something to be investigated in future 
research).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The final stage in the modeling added an interaction effect between need for closure 
and perceived likelihood (Figure 4).
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 Support was found for hypothesis nine: the stronger the 
need for cognitive closure, the stronger the conditional correlation between worry about crime 
and perceived likelihood. A likelihood ratio test indicated that the interaction effect involving 
likelihood and cognitive closure increased the fit of the model at the 5% significance level. 
Among individuals who perceived the probability of falling victim in the next twelve months 
to be low, people with a high need for cognitive closure worried less than people with a low 
need for cognitive closure. Worry about crime was especially low among people with a high 
need for cognitive closure who also believed that the probability of victimization was low. 
(Please note: a graphic visualization of the two interaction effects can be found in the online 
supplementary material.) 
Kruglanski & collleagues (e.g. Kruglanski & Webster, 1996: 263) talk about need for 
cognitive closure being a ‘motivated closing of the mind’ and a ‘desire for certain knowledge 
on some issue.’ The current study did not find a direct link between need for cognitive closure 
and subjective probabilities; one might posit that people who have a ‘desire to achieve a firm 
answer to a question and an aversion toward ambiguity’ (ibid: 264) will also be motivated to 
represent crime is something unlikely to happen to them. But what about the interaction effect 
between perceived likelihood and need for cognitive closure?  
If one conceives of perceived likelihood as psychological distance, then this may help 
us understand the interaction between need for cognitive closure and perceived likelihood. 
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 For robustness checks, each latent interaction effect was estimated separately, with almost identical 
results to Figure 4 (details available on request).  
Imagine a group of people who all construe victimisation as psychologically distant. They 
represent the potential victimisation event as distant over space, time and social distance, in 
that it is something that they believe is unlikely to happen in the areas they frequent, unlikely 
to happen in the immediate future, and unlikely to happen to themselves. The current findings 
suggest that people with a high need for cognitive closure will worry less than people with a 
low need for cognitive closure because certainty and closure brings with it a sense of positive 
affect, which helps to reduce worry (see the graphical visualisation in the online 
supplementary material). The current findings also suggest that when victimisation is 
psychologically proximate, then uncertainty and the lack of closure will bring with it a sense 
of negative affect that makes worry more frequent.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study found that adults in Italy, Bulgaria and Lithuania tended to worry about falling 
victim of crime when they represented the criminal event as being (a) likely to occur to them, 
(b) highly consequential if the event were to transpire, and (c) difficult to control in its nature 
and occurrence. Of note was that perceived probability seemed to ‘multiply’ – in the sense of 
a statistical interaction – with perceived outcome to predict expressed emotion. Findings thus 
generally corroborate and extend the risk sensitivity model of worry about crime, which was 
previously only tested in a city-wide sample in Seattle and a study of two London 
neighbourhoods (Warr, 1987; Jackson, 2011). One exception was the relative unimportance 
of perceived control in the current study: perceived control did not predict perceived 
likelihood, nor did it interact with perceived likelihood to predict worry about crime. It is for 
future research to drill into the issue, perhaps by widening the scope of people’s sense of 
efficacy and control. 
Two theoretically novel findings were of note. The first was that subjective 
probability judgments interacted not only with perceived consequence, but also with people’s 
aversion to uncertainty and need for certainty. This suggests a new direction for risk 
sensitivity research (Warr, 1987; Jackson, 2011). People may worry about falling victim 
(even when they view the probability of victimization to be relatively low) not only because 
they see the personal consequences to be especially high, but also because they feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty, desire predictability and like order and structure in their 
lives. If they are averse to psychologically proximate threat – largely constituted by the belief 
that the likelihood of victimization is high – we might call them ‘sensitive to risk.’ Risk 
sensitivity may thus be not only about representations of the outcome of a given personal 
threat, but also about the individual differences in need for order, certainty, predictability and 
decisiveness that shape affective response to risk. 
The second theoretically new finding was that people with a high need for cognitive 
closure tended to believe that the personal consequences of crime were more severe. At this 
juncture one can only speculate. But the effect may reflect a stronger inclination among 
individuals with a high need for closure to ‘seize’ and ‘freeze’ on the vivid and sensational 
criminal events that the media tend to report, thereby shaping their perceptions of the 
consequences (i.e. nature) of criminal victimization. If this is true, however, the fact that need 
for cognitive closure did not predict perceived control or perceived likelihood is puzzling; 
presumably these same dramatic and vivid crimes often seem both highly consequential, 
highly difficult to control, and sensational. Perhaps people with a high need for cognitive 
closure also tend to be motivated to believe that they have control over their lives and are 
motivated to see less threat around them? This general tendency may work in the opposite 
direction to an effect of ‘seizing’ and ‘freezing’ on media images, thus cancelling out the 
effect in the other direction. This is an issue for future research. 
Naturally, some limitations of the study should not go without comment. The 
empirical work presented in this paper operates within the dominant paradigm in 
criminological inquiry into fear of crime. This is a strength – in that the findings slot neatly 
into an established literature. Observational data of the kind produced in the present work 
allows one to model conditional correlations using national probability samples. Good quality 
samples are powerful – in that they allow one to make inferences to a broader population. But 
the methodology is also a weakness. Surveys like these do not allow one to make causal 
claims. First, there may be any number of confounding variables in the conditional 
associations reported in this study. Second, it is likely that the arrow of causality between risk 
perception and emotion goes both ways (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Kuppens et al., 2012).
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Third, the time ordering may not be so clear. In particular the study assumes stability in risk 
perception and need for cognitive closure. The measure of worry about crime focused on past 
episodes, whereas the measures of risk perception and need for cognitive closure focused on 
the present. Linking current assessments of the likelihood of criminal victimisation to past 
worry about crime (over the past twelve months) thus assumes that the assessment of 
likelihood has remained relatively stable over the past twelve months.  
Finally, the current study has only scratched the surface of the links between need for 
cognitive closure and risk perception. The assumption has been that people with a high need 
for cognitive closure were more likely to be influenced by frightening mass media 
representations of crime that are biased towards the dramatic and sensational. Yet, there may 
be any number of competing accounts and related hypotheses regarding the links between 
cognitive closure and risk perception.  
 
Final words 
It is hoped, in closing, that the replication and theoretical novelty of this study helps to 
mitigate certain methodological weaknesses. The central contribution has been to underline 
the importance of Warr’s (1987) notion of risk sensitivity, as well as the potential significance 
of need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Studies into fear of crime often 
treat risk perception as an important mediating factor, linking perceived disorder (for 
example) to perceived likelihood, and perceived likelihood in turn to emotional response 
(Ferraro, 1995; Farrall et al., 2009). Yet, such studies also tend to define risk perception in a 
rather narrow fashion, typically focusing only on perceived likelihood.  
One way forward is to examine not only additive and interactive effects of perceived 
likelihood, control and consequence, but also individual differences in information judgement 
and processing. Why do victimisation experience, neighbourhood context, perceived disorder 
and media consumption shape expressed emotions about becoming a victim of crime? It may 
be that these factors shape not just perceived likelihood, but also perceived control and 
perceived consequence. For instance, seeing disorder in one’s neighbourhood may lower 
one’s sense of control over potential victimisation. These dimensions of perceived risk may 
then interact to shape expressed emotion.  
Need for cognitive closure may also play an important role in the inferences that people 
make from their environment, their personal victimisation experience, and from hearing about 
crime. For example, people with a high need for cognitive closure may more readily ‘seize’ 
and ‘freeze’ on personal victimisation experience, thereby drawing especially strong 
inferences about personal risk and threat. People with a high need for cognitive closure may 
also tend to draw quick and strong inferences from ambiguous social and physical cues (cf 
Wickes et al., 2013); they may be more likely to conclude that neighbourhood disorder is 
present in their environment and draw subsequently strong inferences about significant 
personal threat. 
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 For example, worry can exacerbate rather than solve problems (Berenbaum, 2010; cf. Jackson & 
Gray, 2010). Pathological worrying can lead to a given danger being constantly rehearsed, leading to 
the ‘catastrophising’ of a problem or event.  
Insights into the psychology of risk may thus enrich our understanding of an important 
social and political phenomenon. This study has highlighted the complex nature of people’s 
judgments of risk, as well as their varying strategies of information judgment and processing 
centre-stage. Alloyed with insights into cognitive closure and aversion to uncertainty, the risk 
sensitivity model may stimulate future research, helping to push the literature forward in new 
and fruitful directions. 
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 Table 1 
Demographic composition of the three samples 
 Gender Age Location 
 Male  
% 
Female 
% 
Mean SD Big 
city  
% 
Suburbs 
or 
outskirts 
of a big 
city % 
Town or 
small city 
% 
Country 
village 
% 
Farm or 
home in 
the 
country 
% 
Italy 51% 49% 48 18 15% 10% 28% 45% 1% 
Bulgaria 57% 43% 52 18 37% 6% 26% 31% 0% 
Lithuania 57% 43% 51 18 43% 0% 22% 33% 1% 
 
 Table 2 
Correlations between latent variables 
 Cognitive 
closure 
Perceived 
likelihood 
Perceived 
control 
Perceived 
consequence 
Worry about 
crime 
Cognitive closure 1     
Perceived likelihood .01 1    
Perceived control .00 .05*** 1   
Perceived consequence .09*** .24*** .05* 1  
Worry about crime .05*** .25*** -.05* .24*** 1 
Note. Correlations from a five-factor confirmatory factor analysis model.  
* p <.05. ** p <.01. *** p <.001. 
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